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1 |  INTRODUCTION
On 1 June 2017 the Kenyan government celebrated the completion of Phase I of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project. 
Funded with loans from EXIM (The Export- Import Bank of China), the project, for which construction started in October 
2014, now connects the port of Mombasa, the biggest seaport in Kenya, with the capital city of Nairobi, from which the Phase 
IIA of the project goes 120 kilometres further north- west and reaches the town of Naivasha.1 The SGR is a flagship project of 
the national development programme “Vision 2030” that, focusing on mega- projects, aims to transform Kenya into a newly 
industrialised country, overcome its aid dependencies, and achieve a “middle- income status” in less than two decades (see Enns, 
2019). In this context, the Kenyan government has celebrated the SGR as a promise of greater connectivity and “development.” 
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Abstract
The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya, inaugurated in 2017, has been pro-
moted by the Kenyan government as a promise of “development” and “prospering 
people.” This paper demonstrates how, contrary to these narratives, the SGR re-
iterates the pre- existing relations of difference mediated by class, geography, and 
ethnicity. Focusing on material and semiotic forms of the SGR infrastructures, it spe-
cifically shows how the railway project functions as the techno- politics of differen-
tiation that governs by including “prospering publics” of urban middle classes into 
Kenya's modernist development vision, providing unstable hopes for “development” 
to more precarious peri- urban and rural “anticipating populations,” but simultane-
ously constituting “excluded populations” in rural landscapes that are denied the pos-
sibility of being a part of the national modernist development vision. Highlighting this 
intimate relationship between infrastructure, governance, and biopolitics, the paper 
demonstrates that mega- infrastructures – differentiating between the publics included 
in, and the populations excluded from, the state's development visions and practices, 
as well as unstable subjective dispositions in- between – engender modalities of non- 
belonging that fall outside of (inherently liberal) frames of “citizenship” or a “public” 
frequently employed in critical infrastructure scholarship.
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Boarding the SGR train, for instance, one can read a logo imprinted on all train coaches – “connecting nations, prospering peo-
ple.” It is on this promise of “prospering people” that I focus in this paper. The logo displayed on 67 coaches of the train that 
traverses the landscape from Mombasa to Nairobi four times daily highlights how the railway project, harbouring modernist 
dreams of “progress,” is also meant to create “prospering publics” as a part of Kenya's development vision.
In geographical scholarship, infrastructures have been analysed as mediating relations of exchange over distance: they intercon-
nect people, objects, and landscapes, thereby co- producing spaces through which modern socio- economic systems operate (Graham 
& Marvin, 1996, 2001). This structural role of infrastructures in aligning physical networks, social systems, and commodification 
processes has been explored in recent scholarship on mega- infrastructures that analyses their role in ordering capitalist expansion 
across the globe, particularly through urban infrastructures (Kanai & Schindler, 2018; Wiig & Silver, 2019). However, despite ap-
proaching infrastructure as a medium of social relations, geographical scholarship is just starting to pay sufficient attention to how 
infrastructures affect – subjugate, configure, or articulate – populations who use, live in, or around them. While the volume edited 
by Graham and McFarlane (2015), for instance, provides a conceptually diverse account of how infrastructures intersect with urban 
life, Fredericks (2018) and Lemanski (2019) explicitly focus on citizenship. Fredericks (2018) analyses how socio- political be-
longing, understood through the analytic of “garbage citizenship,” is constituted through one's quotidian and political engagement 
with waste management infrastructures in urban Senegal. In a similar vein, the volume on “infrastructural citizenship” edited by 
Lemanski (2019) examines the material and civil nature of urban life for both the state and its citizens.
This entanglement of infrastructure with social lives, on the other hand, has been extensively explored in anthropological 
scholarship on the constitution of states’ publics in relation to state- led infrastructural projects. For Harvey and Knox, “the 
‘public’ itself also has to be conjured up as a material presence alongside [infrastructural projects]” (2015, p. 88); De Boeck has 
referred to infrastructure as material forms “around which publics thicken” (2012, n.p.). According to Von Schnitzler (2018), 
infrastructures relate populations to states as publics. As Larkin writes eloquently, infrastructures “address and constitute sub-
jects” – railway and road networks or communication systems mobilise publics through “affect and the senses of desire, pride, 
and frustration” (2013, p. 329, 333). This process is not even, but inscribes social difference, for infrastructures “mediate, ex-
tend, and differentiate human life” (Anand, 2017, p. 225). Therefore, within this scholarship, infrastructure is analysed as a form 
of governance characterised by a heterogeneously situated, quotidian interplay between the state's development practices and 
its publics subjected to, as well as contesting, social, economic, and political modes of power mediated through infrastructure.
As this brief overview demonstrates, both geographical and anthropological scholarships on infrastructure predominantly 
focus on “citizenship” or states’ “publics.” These conceptual lenses function as primary vectors of socio- political belonging 
– either provided by the state or demanded by social contestation to be included into the national body politic – through which 
socio- political effects of infrastructure are analysed (e.g., Anand, 2017; Harvey & Know 2015; Fredericks, 2018; Lemanski, 
2019). However, in such post- colonial contexts as Kenya, this relationship between infrastructures and citizenry cannot be taken 
as a given. As Zeiderman (2016) observes astutely, such notions of belonging as citizenship might result in epistemological 
obscurity in postcolonial societies whose histories escape inherently liberal conceptualisations of state– society relations and a 
discourse of rights to citizenship. In fact, in these contexts, some populations, deemed disposable, are cast outside the bound-
aries of one collective identity embodied in the idea of citizenship (see Chakrabarty, 2000; Chatterjee, 2011). Indeed, across 
Sub- Saharan Africa, historically, the right to citizenship – and “being a public” of a state's development visions and practices 
– has been attributed to only a part of the national population. In Kenya, for instance, during the colonial period, infrastruc-
tural developments (most prominently the Uganda Railway) were central in asserting colonial state power over the colony's 
population (see Clemm, 2018), differentiating it between a small minority of white citizens with state- provided access to pri-
vate property, on the one hand, and native subjects explicitly excluded from citizenship and property rights, on the other (see 
Morgan, 1963). This colonial differentiation of life inscribed patterns of mobility that continue until today; as recent research 
on mega- infrastructures in Kenya demonstrates, coloniality is re- constituted through contemporary mega- projects and their 
racialised (Kimari & Ernstson, 2020) and extractivist logics (Enns & Bersaglio, 2020). Therefore, as Von Schnitzler (2016) 
argues in the context of apartheid in South Africa, infrastructures, rather than enabling and sustaining a particular public as a 
target of biopolitical interventions, might prevent a public from coming into being. As a result, through multiple exclusions, 
specific population groups are subjected to structural modalities of harm- making as anthropological literature on “infrastruc-
tural violence” demonstrates (Appel, 2012; Rodgers, 2012; Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012).
At the intersection of geographical and anthropological scholarships, in the context of the SGR development in Kenya, in the 
paper I analyse how infrastructure constitutes different subject positions at both techno- political and emotive levels. As Larkin 
observes, infrastructures “form us as subjects not just on a techno- political level but also through the mobilization of affect and 
the senses of desire, pride, and frustration, feelings which can be deeply political” (2013, p. 333). In other words, infrastructure 
– as the techno- political modality of governance that advances specific political projects and visions of the state (see Barry, 
2001; Hecht, 2011; Mitchel, 2002; Von Schnitzler, 2016) – shapes the subject's life at a material level, as well as provides a 
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semiotic framework for the subject to make sense of her personal experience and social position within the techno- political 
setting of the state co- constituted by infrastructure. However, rather than focusing on “citizenship” as the main framework to 
analyse these experiences of subjectivisation as is prominent in the aforementioned literatures (e.g., Anand, 2017; Fredericks, 
2018; Harvey & Knox, 2015; Lemanski, 2019), in this paper I show how mega- infrastructures engender subject positions of 
non- belonging that cannot be explained through the frames of “citizenship” or a “public.” I call this subject group a “popula-
tion” – people who live in a territory of the country but who, while formally being a part of the national citizenry, are not sym-
bolically and materially included in the state's development visions and practices. Infrastructure does not relate this population 
to the state as its intended public: to paraphrase Marx’s (1990) insights on “relative surplus populations,” this subject group is 
superfluous to the needs of the capitalist state.
Following this conceptual separation between a “public” and a “population,” I highlight how the governance of a public (as 
a target of state's development visions) and a population (left outside of state- led development practices) unfolds through infra-
structure. Reflecting on how different social groups experience the Kenyan government's modernist vision advanced through 
semiotic and material forms of the SGR, I specifically argue that this mega- project functions as techno- politics of differentia-
tion. This form of governance engenders social, political, and material alterity between “prospering publics” of urban middle 
classes included in Kenya's development vision, more precarious peri- urban and rural “anticipating populations” that are given 
unstable hopes of inclusion in the state's modernisation practices that contingently coincide with the existing local aspirations 
for “development,” as well as “excluded populations” in rural landscapes that are denied the possibility of being a public of the 
national development vision. Focusing on these three categories, I simultaneously show that these subject positions are not ho-
mogeneous nor final; within each subject group there are noticeable contradictions that demonstrate an unstable nature of their 
subjection to a state's techno- politics. However, I argue that these potentially shifting subject positions are stabilised through 
one's class and geography, and in some cases ethnicity. This highlights how techno- politics of infrastructure unfolds through 
social, political, and material differentiation.
The paper is based on five months of fieldwork research – semi- structured and open- ended interviews, as well as informal 
conversations – undertaken over different time periods between November 2018 and January 2020, across multiple sites, in-
cluding provincial government and Kenya Railways offices, railway stations, construction sites, and the SGR contractor com-
pounds and offices, population settlements around railway infrastructures, in urban, peri- urban, and rural areas, and onboard 
train, as well as with civil society groups in Kenya. Therefore, rather than focusing on one specific site, the research was carried 
alongside 472 kilometres of the rail line that connects the two main SGR terminals in Nairobi and Mombasa (SGR I), as well 
as 120 kilometres from Nairobi to Suswa (SGR IIA), and further 112 kilometres from Suswa to Narok as a part of the SGR IIB 
that is to be built (see Figure 1). Methodologically, reading everyday experiences of the SGR project expressed in interviews in 
relation to the modernist dreams of the Kenyan state that are embodied in semiotic and material forms of infrastructure, I use 
three heuristic categories – “prospering publics,” “anticipating populations,” and “excluded populations.” While complexities 
of each group merit further analytical attention in their own right, the paper provides these three lenses in order to highlight the 
techno- politics of differentiation that infrastructure constitutes; this is intended to function as a critical reflection on the (bio)
politics of mega- infrastructures in Kenya and more broadly.
In the paper I first discuss how through the SGR project the Kenyan state is advancing a modernist development vision, 
thereby articulating imaginaries of “prospering publics” that, despite their inherent contradictions, are unevenly sustained by 
urban middle classes. Second, I analyse how the mega- project constitutes “anticipating populations” that are given unstable 
hopes of inclusion into the state's modernisation practices that contingently coincide with the existing local aspirations for 
“development” in urban and rural peripheries. Third, I demonstrate how the SGR developments engender a subject position of 
“excluded populations” in historically marginalised rural localities that, despite socio- economic differences within these land-
scapes, are symbolically and materially denied the possibility of being a part of the national modernist development vision. I 
conclude by summarising the paper's contributions to critical scholarship on infrastructure.
2 |  PROSPERING PUBLICS: IMAGINED AND REAL
For Lefebvre (1991), the social and material relations of a state are vividly expressed in its infrastructures – taking an 
architectural- semiotic form, they denote real and symbolic power of a state to inscribe specific visions of time and progress 
into a physical form, thereby producing spatial configurations that allow specific socio- material relationalities to emerge, while 
disallowing others (also see Joyce, 2003). That is, as large- scale transport infrastructures such as the SGR are projected onto 
social landscapes, they materialise into an aesthetic of grandiosity that embodies imaginaries of modernity and enhanced mo-
bility as signs of “development.” Through this, infrastructures become powerful tools in enhancing the real and symbolic state 
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power: they facilitate regional and global flows of commodities and people, create spaces of continuous exchange, as well as 
incorporate local economies into global capital flows. In Kenya, the SGR rail line that starts at Mombasa on the coast of the 
Indian Ocean is ultimately envisioned to connect Asian commodity markets with Kisumu, a Kenyan port on Lake Victoria, 
and further into East Africa, particularly with Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan. This, in turn, is meant to enhance Kenya's 
strategic role in facilitating global trade across the region.
In political life, besides structuring socio- material relations and expanding frontiers of global capital (Kanai & Schindler, 
2018; Lesutis, 2020; Wiig & Silver, 2019), mega- infrastructures, eliciting awe and admiration, also operate “as concrete semi-
otic and aesthetic vehicles oriented to addressees” (Larkin, 2013, p. 329). That is, infrastructures “also become signs and sym-
bols” (Von Schnitzler, 2018, p. 134), and thus they have political purchase by constituting narratives of a “good life” directed 
to intended states’ publics (Harvey & Knox, 2015, p. 5). They create imaginative geographies (Salamanca, 2015), function as 
“mechanisms to control time” (Graham & Marvin, 1996), instigate “waves of societal progress” (Edwards, 2003, p. 42), or 
“define civilization itself” (Larkin, 2013, p. 332). This is particularly so in geographies of uneven development where mega- 
infrastructures are perceived as prerequisite to “progress” or “modernity” (Anand, 2017, p. 14; Hetherington, 2014).
These semiotic- material forms of infrastructure are vividly expressed in the case of the SGR project that has replaced the 
Uganda Railway built at the start of the 20th century during the British colonisation of East Africa (see Clemm, 2018; Kimari 
& Ernstson, 2020). The SGR line, laid over vast tracts of land, shaping the physical matter of steel, iron, and cement into 
the infrastructural form of the new railway, connects different spaces – the port of Mombasa, the capital city of Nairobi, and 
smaller towns – into the state narrative of “development.” As Kirby (1997) observes, in modern history, railways functioned as 
an apparatus of modernity intended to reshape experiences of space, time, and speed. In Kenya, a similar imaginary of devel-
opment materialises prominently into the form of a train station, particularly the SGR line's main terminal stations in Nairobi 
and Mombasa, around whose material- semiotic forms the discourses of “development” and “Vision 2030” are mobilised. The 
first time I visited the Mombasa terminal, for instance, the station manager and one of the senior engineers of Kenya Railways, 
accompanying me to an air- conditioned VIP room, noted how “the [train] station itself shows the prosperity that Kenya is 
F I G U R E  1  The map of SGR, and fieldwork locations (author data).
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striving to achieve” (30 January 2019, Mombasa). As the engineer explained further, “with the SGR, we are opening up the 
country. Look at these areas, there is going to be a lot of development here around this station. The potential is being brought 
up to the area. We are making sure that our railway stations are accessible. We are creating integrative infrastructures. There is 
opening for potential” (30 January 2019, Mombasa). These imaginaries of the SGR- instigated “development” reflect a broader 
discourse of political elites in Kenya; in the county government office of Taita Taveta, for instance, one county government offi-
cer similarly observed how the “impressive SGR developments” that “have made Voi a fast- developing town” bring substantial 
benefits to Kenya by “opening up the country to business and trade opportunities” (1 February 2019, Mwatate).
Because a state requires a public as an essential, constitutive part of itself as a political entity (see Comaroff, 1998; Death, 
2016), narratives of “development” intertwined with the SGR also produce imaginaries of a “prospering public” that is sup-
posed to benefit from these infrastructural developments. Echoing the objectives of “Vision 2030” narrated by the Kenya 
Railways engineers who translate some of the state power within socio- material landscapes of Kenya, these imaginaries focus 
on the mobility of some populations. As one engineer explained, “the SGR gave people an opportunity to join what this country 
has to offer. Now people can travel more easily, their mobility is facilitated, and they are proper citizens of this country” (1 
February 2019, Voi). This narrative implies that only those who use the new train are proper citizens, thereby revealing the 
implicit normativity of the “prosperous” public imaginary emerging alongside the SGR. That is, as anthropological scholarship 
analyses in detail, symbolic constitution of beneficiary publics is part and parcel of techno- politics of infrastructure (Anand, 
2017; De Boeck, 2012; Harvey & Knox, 2015).
However, rather than just imagined, these state- led narratives of “proper citizens” and “prospering publics” are further 
sustained by urban middle classes that welcome the new railway as a necessary industrial project in Kenya. Spending time 
in and around the SGR stations, it is common to see people taking photographs of themselves in front of railway stations. 
“This is the best thing that happened to Kenya, look at it – it's beautiful,” exclaimed a young civil servant in the intercounty 
station in Voi. As the conversation progressed, he explained to me how “Kenya is no longer a third world country with too 
much poverty, but [instead] building such projects is a country that is becoming a modern world nation” (23 February 2019, 
Voi). This sentiment of national pride and praise for infrastructural developments was commonly shared by other people, 
belonging to urban middle classes, in different stations, or on the SGR train itself, who similarly highlighted the necessity 
to undertake large- scale infrastructural projects for the industrialisation of Kenya. A student group waiting to board a train 
in Nairobi, for instance, noted how the train “facilitates their travelling, making [them] feel like they belong to the forward 
direction that Kenya is taking” (18 March 2019, Nairobi). This “prospering public,” both imagined and real, however, can 
only prosper from these developments – and thus function as the addressees of the SGR project, or Kenya's “Vision 2030” 
more broadly – because they have a necessary economic means to do so. The majority of the people interviewed on the train, 
in both 1st and 2nd class coaches, come from relatively privileged socio- economic backgrounds – including civil service or 
small- scale business sectors – that allow them to participate in the state's imaginaries of “development” that are articulated 
through the SGR project.
Although the semiotic forms of the SGR centred around the narrative of “development” and the enhanced mobility of 
“proper citizens” co- constitute a public that takes pride in Kenya's modernising development vision, these state- led imaginar-
ies of a “prospering public” – and the practices of urban middle classes that partially sustain them – are undermined by strong 
public concerns about the financial sustainability of the mega- project. Because the overall cost of the new railway is estimated 
to be around US$3 billion (and the country's debt for the project amounts to roughly 66 percent of Kenya's external debt), in 
the public domain the project has been criticised for unjustifiably enlarging the country's public debt (see Ndii, 2019). In this 
context, some people in urban areas emphasise that this investment- related debt is unsustainable and thus will lead to an un-
certain future; as one woman observed – “even the babies that [Kenyans] are yet to have will be paying this debt for the SGR” 
(10 February 2019, Nairobi). This demonstrates how unstable the imaginary of a “prospering people” is – for Kenya's public 
debt undoes the possibility of the material prosperity promised by the SGR developments. In this context, those who truly 
benefit from the new railway, at least in material terms, are national political elites. This group, since Structural Adjustment 
implementation in the late 1980s, has been responsible for diverting capital to the private sector, facilitating privatisation 
of national industries, and providing huge tax benefits to foreign direct investment: this unevenly integrated Kenya's econ-
omy into international commodity and finance flows, as well as anchored these national elites in global capital circuits and 
constituted clientelist networks (see Harrison, 2005; Lehman, 1990; Rono, 2002). In this context, reflecting the pre- existing 
dynamics of extractivism and national elite collaboration (see Enns & Bersaglio, 2020; Kimari & Ernstson, 2020), such 
mega- projects as the SGR, with huge public debt, provide new opportunities to re- affirm class power and clientelist networks 
across Kenya.
However, in spite of these dynamics, the relatively privileged class position of urban train users, as well as their symbolic 
and material inclusion into the national modernist vision, contingently stabilise the meaning of the SGR project as a sign of 
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“development.” “It's impossible to develop without loans – loans are issued everywhere in Europe, so why shouldn't we do 
it here?” asked one office clerk rhetorically while travelling from Mombasa to Voi (18 February 2019, Mombasa). These 
narrative articulations show that the semiotic forms of the SGR, while not homogeneous or unchallenged, nevertheless con-
stitute a public that partakes in producing the discourse of “development” constructed around and through the SGR. Even 
if not necessarily prospering in material terms as national political elites, this subject group forms a part of the state's mod-
ernising development vision and practices. As I discuss in the following section, these imaginaries of “prospering publics” 
are partially sustained, albeit in profoundly uncertain ways, by more precarious populations in urban peripheries and rural 
localities across Kenya.
3 |  ANTICIPATING POPULATIONS – NOT (YET) PUBLICS
Even though infrastructures might engage populations in a state's development visions and practices, and thereby symbolically 
and materially constitute them as publics or citizens, in the context of the SGR, infrastructures also engender an ambiguous 
subject position of socio- political belonging. I call it an “anticipating population” that is not yet, or might never be, included 
in state- led modernisation. The existing anthropological literature on social effects of infrastructure in Kenya (Chome, 2020; 
Elliot, 2016; Kochore, 2016) and beyond (Haines, 2018; Hetherington, 2014) focuses on “economies of anticipation” that 
emerge alongside planned development projects. In Kenya, anticipation has been demonstrated to result in a number of strate-
gies of trying to insert oneself into state- orchestrated development practices, particularly through land speculation (Chome, 
2020; Elliott, 2016; Kochore, 2016). In such contexts, the goals of “modernity” or “development,” although directed by the cen-
tral state, are not opposed but supported as long as they provide beneficial forms of inclusion into the planned developments. 
Therefore, state- led development visions are not necessarily external to, but form a part of, local histories and aspirations. In 
this section, focusing on temporalities of the now and of the future, I diverge from these existing literatures on infrastructural 
anticipation, and show that, rather than just a speculative strategy of future- making, anticipation more generally describes a 
precarious subject position of trying to be included in already ongoing development projects, however unstable, or even unat-
tainable, that inclusion might be.
In Kenya, the construction of the SGR project triggered anticipation for “development” in the rural areas that the railway 
traverses. The building of the 592- kilometre railway line (Phases I and IIA) required a significant labour force; according to 
Kenya Railways, the project contractor – China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) – hired around 25,000 Kenyans for 
manual construction work, thereby providing previously absent employment opportunities. In the county of Taita Taveta, for 
instance, in the 49.2 kilometres between Miaseny and Voi train stations, the SGR construction generated an enormous interest 
in employment. Several years after the railway completion, local residents continue to share stories of how when the CRBC 
started its operations, people lined up in queues waiting to be contracted for work. In such rural areas characterised by poverty, 
formal employment is a significant opportunity to relieve existing everyday hardships and, for instance, pay school fees or one's 
debts, buy more nutritious food, or upgrade existing housing infrastructure. Despite numerous allegations of exploitation and 
harsh treatment of manual labourers that abound in Kenya's public space (see Plummer, 2019), residents of Taita Taveta recount 
their employment experiences in positive terms. As one woman explained, “the work was really hard, but it was really helpful. 
With the 500 shillings I received every day, I could pay school fees for my children” (19 February 2019, Maungu).
Besides formal employment, the SGR also generated other economic opportunities to benefit from the railway construc-
tion. Once it commenced, informal economies emerged to provide construction workers with food, water, housing, and other 
services. In Taita Taveta, for instance, the village of Bachuma popped up within the first month of the railway construction, as 
some people who had already lived in the area moved closer to the rail line to provide necessary services to the SGR project 
contractor. This boosted local small- scale business activities. I observed a similar dynamic along the rail line of Phase IIA 
between Nairobi and Naivasha, which was under construction during the time of the research (March– May 2019) where sev-
eral villages, such as Duka Moja or Kimuko (both in Kajiado county), had grown in size due to the incoming labour force and 
booming economic activities related to the SGR construction.
These opportunities inevitably have an expiry date. The project contractors, once a part of the railway is built, leave the area, 
thereby putting an end to the hopes of “development.” This can be observed in the aforementioned village of Bachuma, whose 
residents, after the SGR completion, are now struggling to make ends meet. “This train has given us life, but it has also taken 
it away,” observed one man who now has lost all his clients for his drinks shop (19 February 2019, Taita Taveta). Alongside 
Phase IIA of the SGR that was being built at the time of the research, some workers were equally aware that the opportunities 
provided by the railway construction were temporary. One young man employed as a driver described the relation between the 
local labour force and the CRBC in the following way:
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“I understand that these work opportunities are not going to last. If [CRBC] were serious about helping us, they 
would train us, they would give us skills how to continue. But now many people who are casual labourers will be 
made redundant, this is just how it is. I thought that they would do something to empower the youth, will show us 
how to do business, but now they are just using us for cheap labour.” (8 March 2019, Kimuko)
These individual narratives reflect more widely shared concerns about the socio- economic sustainability of the SGR project 
and the sense that it has not provided enough skill transfer in engineering and construction sectors for the Kenyan labour force (see 
Plummer, 2019).
However, as anticipations for “development” inevitably expire in these disadvantaged rural localities, the SGR development 
simultaneously activates hopes for socio- economic prosperity in urban peripheries where local actors try to integrate them-
selves in the new transportation system. Like with land speculation in other parts of Kenya (see Chome, 2020; Elliott, 2016), in 
the areas close to the new train stations some residents are constructing rental houses in anticipation of future urban growth to 
be triggered by the new railway. For now, some of these houses are rented by the SGR management and maintenance workforce. 
In Voi, for instance, in the areas around the train station, rental housing prices increased by 15 percent after the completion of 
the mega- project, and some people started renting out their houses to newcomers to make a profit. These processes also led 
to increasing land value. In Suswa, for example, which is relatively close to Nairobi and the existing CRBC compounds, there 
has been a sharp rise in local land value; at the time of the research when the Suswa SGR station was nearing completion (May 
2019), land cost increased fivefold (from one to five million Kenyan shillings per acre of serviced land).
The completed SGR train stations also present opportunities for other local- scale economic activities such as transportation. 
When the train arrives, the main SGR terminals in Nairobi and Mombasa are quickly overcrowded with buses and taxis to be 
boarded by train passengers. Similarly, in some intercounty stations such as Voi in Taita Taveta, already at the intersection of 
the existing busy trade and travel routes between Kenya and Tanzania, as well as a gateway to Tsavo East National Park, the new 
train contributes to the increasing flow of travellers. Twice a day, when the intercounty train passes the area, the parking space 
next to the train station fills with tuk- tuk, boda- boda, and taxi drivers who compete with each other for passengers alighting 
the train. In this context, these young men perceive the SGR as a positive development, expressing their wishes of having more 
frequent passenger trains that would bring them customers. In highly precarious peri- urban milieus where they constantly have 
to eke out a living, the train passengers are a means to become a part of the SGR infrastructures. As Simone (2015) observes, 
in such situations social relations gain infrastructural properties: they substitute and complement the existing limited infra-
structures, as well as create continually shifting operational spaces in which one can participate, albeit in uncertain ways, in the 
modernist development vision of Kenya.
These processes, besides providing new livelihood opportunities also activate broader expectations and hopes for “develop-
ment” that contingently coincide with the national modernist project expressed in “Vision 2030.” The taxi drivers in Voi, for 
instance, see their town as a rapidly developing place. As one tuk- tuk driver recounted, “Voi is currently a metropolitan town. 
Most tribes are here, they are really developing the town. In the years to come, this town will be a great place to do business” 
(23 February 2019, Voi). These processes instigate anticipations of “development” in Kenya at large, for they particularly trig-
ger expectations of connectivity and mobility that are perceived as signs of future prosperity and abundance. As the same man 
noted, “[people] are waiting for the railway line to Kisumu, we will get fresh fish from the Lake Victoria. It will develop Voi 
and it will be a great town, it is already happening” (23 February 2019, Voi). This narrative articulation highlights how the SGR 
project configures “anticipating” populations whose expectations for a brighter future extend beyond the boundaries of their 
environs into larger socio- material constellations of national “development.”
This anticipation to be included in the modern Kenya is not only rendered unstable by the temporary nature of the SGR 
economic boom associated with its construction, but is also rendered fragile by the broader political economy of global finance. 
The plan to extend the train line from Naivasha to Kisumu on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria (and further into East Africa) 
– Phase IIB of the Kenyan SGR – was put on hold in May 2019 due to lack of funding from EXIM, thereby questioning the 
viability of the whole SGR project (see Ndii, 2019). However, as this section demonstrates, in spite of this instability, the SGR 
infrastructures constitute “anticipating populations” that are trying to be a part of the national infrastructure development that 
had already materialised but is yet to bring prosperity. Through anticipation – as a mode of orienting one's livelihood practices 
in relation to the newly built infrastructures – these populations contingently fit into the modernist vision of the Kenyan state. 
Due to the inherently precarious nature of this subject position characterised by unprivileged class position and relatively mar-
ginal geography, these groups are not yet the “prospering public” conjured up by the Kenyan state alongside the SGR line. In 
fact, they might never become that public, for their attachments to the mega- project and the state- led modernist vision of “de-
velopment” are only sutured by limited possibilities to participate in the infrastructural present that is fundamentally precarious. 
This unstable subject position, therefore, might be experienced as symbolic and material exclusion, as I discuss next.
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4 |  EXCLUDED POPULATIONS: MODES OF NON- BELONGING
While infrastructural projects generate prospects of “prosperity,” their development also engenders social exclusion, vulner-
ability, and destabilisation. As Rao summarises eloquently, “to talk about infrastructure is to invoke both the promise of a 
future as well as imminent trauma” (2015, p. 39). In Kenya, this infrastructural trauma has manifested as a material and sym-
bolic exclusion of rural populations from modernist visions and practices. Even if the Kenyan state mobilises the narrative of 
“prospering people” that is partially supported and sustained by the urban middle classes, and even if these dynamics might 
give unstable hopes of inclusion into the national development vision to the “anticipating populations” in peripheral areas, in 
this section, looking beyond these dynamics, I examine how the SGR constitutes “excluded populations” that do not count as a 
public of Kenya's development vision. In contrast to the literatures that, in contexts of infrastructure- produced marginalisation, 
focus on different articulations of citizenship that emerge through contestations of this exclusion, whether through everyday 
modalities of resistance (Anand, 2017; De Boeck, 2012; Harvey & Knox, 2015; Lemanski, 2019) or more explicit political 
forms of mobilisation (Fredericks, 2018; Von Schnitzler, 2016), I show that in Kenya the SGR denies a specific subject group 
the possibility of becoming a public of the national development vision by symbolically and materially excluding it from 
mega- infrastructures.
The Kenyan SGR project realisation has been characterised by the disruption of socio- material landscapes, which is par-
ticularly visible in relation to land. According to the Constitution of Kenya, national interest – such as mega- projects that are 
deemed fundamental to the development strategy “Vision 2030” – supersedes any private interests. Therefore, when these 
projects pass private lands, individual households need to accept financial compensation and relocate. In this context, the SGR 
project- implementing national actor, the Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development, requested the 
National Land Commission to carry out land evaluation and compensation in order to facilitate the population relocation that 
was necessary for the SGR project. However, the land values prescribed by the Commission were challenged for being too low 
by numerous individuals, which has resulted in a plethora of ongoing litigation cases on corruption. Relatedly, there have been 
other court cases arising due to a number of households without official land titles not receiving any compensation for the land 
availed to the railway project.
These uneven processes of relocation and land compensation reflect broader dynamics of contemporary development pat-
terns across Sub- Saharan Africa that, based on land enclosure, enhance socio- economic differences (Kirshner & Power, 2015; 
Lesutis, 2019). Despite the allegations of corruption, individuals with large land- holdings and secure land titles received size-
able financial compensation, with some reaching nearly 30 million Kenyan Shillings (more than US$280,000). With these 
financial resources, these individuals upgraded or built new houses, fenced their lands, or invested in real estate in peri- urban 
areas. Therefore, due to the SGR construction and the associated financial compensation, the socio- economic position of large- 
scale land holders was significantly enhanced. This, however, was not the case with poor households with insecure land titles 
and small- scale land holdings, ranging from one to three acres, that were only compensated for housing structures that needed 
to be relocated due to the SGR construction; as a result, these families, having not received any financial compensation, were 
made land insecure by the SGR developments. As one woman observed, “I lost the land that I lived on because of the train. 
Because I am poor, I did not receive anything. It is only the rich who get money out of this train” (28 February 2019, Mtito 
Andei).
In spite of these variations in the financial compensation that accentuate the existing socio- economic differences, the 
SGR has excluded rural populations from the state's development visions irrespective of one's socio- economic position. 
This can be understood by looking at the material form of the railway infrastructures; as Harvey and Knox (2015) observe, 
infrastructure registers the state presence or neglect, around which public expectations are built (also see Anand, 2017; 
Larkin, 2008). The SGR is a railway with a track gauge of 1,445 mm (4 feet 8½ inches) that significantly alters material 
landscapes. Even though the new railway generally runs parallel to the colonial Uganda Railway, it has a straighter track 
alignment that accommodates higher speed. Due to the hilly terrain, this alignment could only be achieved by building 
the SGR on viaducts, embankments, and through cuttings. Therefore, unlike the existing transportation routes such as the 
Nairobi– Mombasa Road or the Uganda Railway which were built at ground level and so collisions with wildlife, livestock, 
and people are common, viaducts (as high as 43 metres) and embankments (as high as 27 meters) elevate the SGR above 
ground level.
According to both Kenya Railways and the project implementing contractor CRBC, these underpasses allow humans, live-
stock, and wildlife populations to safely pass underneath the SGR line, which conclusively shows that the railway intersects 
with the pre- existing landscapes in a socially and environmentally sustainable way. As one Kenya Railways engineer explained, 
“a project like SGR cannot go through if we do not get the approval from the specific government ministries. The construc-
tion was done by the law, and we had an official license from NEMA” (31 January 2019, Nairobi). However, even if such 
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mega- investments as the SGR project are legally required to undertake environmental and social impact assessments that must 
be approved by the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) before they commence, the actual dynamics on the 
ground are different. According to community leaders in the rural localities traversed by the SGR, this legally required public 
consultation was extremely low through all stages of the project. As one village secretary observed, “we know nothing about 
the SGR. They do whatever they want, and we just have to stand and watch what is happening to our environment” (4 May 
2019, Kima, Kajiado).
Relatedly, civil activists highlight that in remote rural areas, whose people have little or no political influence, public con-
sultation was not carried out at all. In the best- case scenario, rather than being consulted about potential social, economic, and 
ecological impacts, affected populations were informed about the SGR arrival. This usually happened in a one- off community 
meeting, where government officials presented the upcoming project to village elders. These presentations were dominated 
by narratives of a “better life,” “development,” and “life- long employment” that were used to convince these communities 
to support these investments. If this discourse was challenged by community representatives, or civil society groups, they 
were labelled as “anti- development” to undermine their legitimacy. This resonates with broader national dynamics of framing 
dispossession and other negative accumulative effects of development projects as necessary to “give way to development” 
(Kanyinga, 2000, p. 6). It also highlights the exclusion of these populations from national legal frameworks of governance. As 
one civil activist observed, “the problem with [mega- projects in Kenya] is that they are not done according to the law, and that 
they do not include local communities. People are left out, as if they were outside the law, as if they were not supposed to be 
properly presented by the national law of Kenya” (3 January 2020, Lamu). In other words, these marginal population groups are 
governed by their exclusion from the national modernist development vision and its practices.
The end result is that mega- infrastructures are built in a way that negatively interferes with local lifeworlds. In anthropolog-
ical literature, these dynamics that result in neglect, abandonment, and everyday hardship are perceived as modalities of struc-
tural violence that are inflicted on those excluded from infrastructure networks of mobility and opportunity (see Appel, 2012; 
Rodgers, 2012; Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012). Reflecting these dynamics, in the historically marginalised rural localities that the 
SGR passes, people point out how the railway, cutting customary road access routes, physically splitting villages, or even family 
lands, interrupts local socio- material orders and contributes to everyday hardships. According to several community leaders:
“During the construction stage there was no [mutual understanding or] government representatives, so the contrac-
tors could do anything they wanted, and they tried to save money, so they cut corners. They [did not] care about 
people or environment here. They just left when they were done. People are now enclosed within their own land, 
they are landlocked here.” (5 March 2019, Kima, Kajiado)
In a similar way, several Kenya Railways community liaison officers noted that the SGR design ignored local social dynamics 
and mobility patterns because it was developed by the main project contractor in China. As one of them recounted:
“We didn't really ask what these local communities really want and how they see the development going for them. 
Before we reached them, everything was already decided – the railway route, the bridges, the underpasses. All of that 
was done. The instruction for us was to get the community on board, so they [do not] oppose the project, and [do not] 
cause us problems later.” (15 February 2019)2
Therefore, as there was no meaningful community consultation about the SGR design, the project contractor did not provide un-
derpasses where they were needed to minimise the negative impacts of the railway project, thereby resulting in a number of everyday 
difficulties for the surrounding populations that I outline above.
With the SGR negatively interfering with the social topographies of everyday life, for wealthier land- holders the new rail-
way causes resentment, for, dividing the landscape and interrupting mobility patterns, the project marginalises them. Their 
livelihoods are not integrated into national value chains developed through the railway that facilitates other forms of mobility 
– namely, of transnational capital and relatively privileged urban classes, as I discuss in Section 2. In this context where the 
SGR does not directly include them into the national modernist vision of “development,” some of these land- holders indicate 
that, unlike the old colonial railway that had a higher number of intercounty stations (34 in total), the current Phase I of the 
SGR, with fewer of them (7 between Mombasa and Nairobi), is much more difficult to use. “These stations are not for us. There 
is no development that the SGR is going to bring to us. We are not expecting anything. Nothing. They have just misused our 
land” (11 March 2019, Athi River). Therefore, even if some of these wealthier land- holders could be seen as enhancing their 
socio- economic position due to the significant financial compensation for their land, their lives, nevertheless, are challenged by 
the SGR presence, which they are keen to first highlight in fieldwork encounters. The benefits of the financial compensation, 
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on the other hand, are not given much importance, for in these lifeworlds the value of land cannot be equally substituted with 
financial compensation. As one man explained, “Once you lose your land, it's forever. There is nothing like land. So once you 
lose your land, you are done” (5 March 2019, Kitingela, Kajiado).
These everyday narratives demonstrate how the SGR functions as the techno- politics of differentiation that denies one's 
place in the “developed” Kenya that is vividly envisaged in the modernist “Vision 2030.” It marginalises those who, due to 
their livelihood practices dependent on land, are not only excluded from the development vision in any meaningful way, but 
are also disadvantaged by the materiality of mega- infrastructures. Although this dynamic is expressed differently along the 
lines of class within rural localities, these differences are stabilised by the shared experience of exclusion from the national 
modernist vision, as well as by other social- political modalities of belonging. This particularly concerns ethnicity, which in 
Kenya – despite its fundamental re- negotiability in relation to dynamically changing socio- political relations (see Lynch, 
2006) – functions as a significant marker of social identity, particularly in relation to land and territory (see Jenkins, 2012). 
In the context of the SGR, Maasai men, for instance, see their exclusion from the railway mega- project as primarily based on 
their historical marginalisation by the central state dominated by Kikuyus within the national ethno- regional settlement. As 
one of them noted, “this train is for the Kikuyu government. […] It is for the children of Kikuyus who go to China to train and 
then get jobs. Go to the [SGR] train stations, nobody from our lands work there” (14 March 1990, Kima, Kajiado). As Lynch 
(2006) has argued in other contexts of Kenya, a sense of marginalisation often results in a further assertion and articulation of 
ethnic differences between communities. This, as Chome (2020) and Elliot (2016) show, has been prominent in several regions 
of Kenya where new investment projects re- activate ethnic binaries between autochthonous “host” populations and newcomer 
“guests”/“immigrants.” In the case of the SGR, for the social groups symbolically and materially excluded from the moderni-
sation processes that the mega- project advances, the railway becomes a material site through which one's marginalised place 
in Kenya is evaluated. This dynamic, intersecting with the relations of class and ethnicity across rural topographies, I argue, 
constitutes a subject position of “excluded populations” denied the possibility of being a public of the national modernist 
development vision and its practices.
5 |  CONCLUSION
In this paper, focusing on the semiotic and material forms of the SGR project in Kenya, I discussed how mega- infrastructures 
function as the techno- politics of differentiation that governs national populations by relating them to state- led development 
visions and practices in uneven, contradictory ways. Rather than conjuring up a “prospering people” as the intended public of 
the state, the SGR project reiterates the pre- existing relations of alterity, differentiating between the publics included in, and 
the populations excluded from, the state's modernist development vision and practices, as well as unstable subjective disposi-
tions in- between, particularly mediated by class and geography, and ethnicity. I demonstrated how these processes unfold by 
discussing how, through the new railway infrastructures, Kenya is advancing a modernist development vision, thereby pro-
ducing imaginaries of “prospering publics” that, despite their inherent contradictions, are sustained by urban middle classes. 
Although not thoroughly fitting the category of the intended state's public, this dynamic is also fragmentedly embodied by 
more precarious “anticipating populations” in rural localities or urban peripheries where the state- led modernisation practices 
contingently coincide with the existing local desires for “development.” However, other rural populations, particularly from 
historically disadvantaged ethnic groups, having lost their land and being negatively impacted by the new railway, are materi-
ally and symbolically excluded from these infrastructural developments and thus, rendered “excluded populations,” are denied 
the possibility of being a “public” of the national modernist development vision.
Focusing on these three different modalities of (non)belonging, the paper simultaneously underlines that these subject 
positions are not homogeneous or final. Within each group there are noticeable contradictions that demonstrate an unstable 
nature of their subjection to the techno- politics of differentiation unfolding through the SGR mega- project. This means that 
subject positions will shift from “anticipation” to “exclusion,” once hopes for development dissipate. Depending on possibilities 
of political mobilisation, some groups will also actively challenge their marginalisation, through available means attempting 
to insert themselves into national development visions and practices (see Sulle, 2020) and protect local elite interests (see 
Cormack, 2016) as research in the region demonstrates (see Enns & Bersaglio, 2020). In northern Kenya, for instance, pasto-
ralist groups, neglected by the state's mega- projects, have been successfully defending their land rights through regional court 
systems, thereby preventing their exclusion from “Vision 2030” (Enns, 2019). Such modes of contestation, as I indicated in 
Section 4, have also been triggered by the SGR, with many individuals legally challenging the National Land Commission for 
inefficient financial compensation processes, this way resisting their subjection to material and symbolic exclusion from the 
state's development practices.
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Methodologically, the subject positions of “prospering publics” and “anticipating” or “excluded populations,” emerging 
in fieldwork encounters, should not be understood as conclusive representations of the heterogeneous lifeworlds that the SGR 
comes in contact with. Instead, they should be read as contingent articulations of oneself that unfold through implicit negoti-
ation processes between a researcher and a research participant that are simultaneously embedded in broader socio- political 
and material contexts (see Lesutis, 2018). While the positionality of a researcher influences how different groups narrate their 
experiences of infrastructure, their subject positions, rather than only being time- and space- specific articulations of oneself, 
also function as micro lenses into larger socio- material processes that unfold beyond any individual's control or influence. 
Therefore, “prospering publics,” “anticipating,” or “excluded populations” are heuristic categories (and thus unavoidably lim-
ited approximations to the social textures of everyday life co- constituted by the SGR) that I employ to highlight how the 
techno- politics of infrastructure unfolds through differentiation mediated by class, geography, and ethnicity. Acknowledging 
the inherent instability of these subject positions – and of their conceptualisation – I read their discursive articulations as social 
texts in relation to the modernist dreams of Kenya expressed in the semiotic and material forms of the SGR infrastructures, 
thereby demonstrating an intimate relationship between infrastructure, governance, and biopolitics.
Developing these analyses, the paper makes several contributions to geographical and anthropological literatures on 
socio- political effects of infrastructure. First, it highlights how, besides ordering capitalist spaces and territorialities (Kanai 
& Schindler, 2018; Lesutis, 2020; Wiig & Silver, 2019), mega- infrastructures also govern social life through socio- political 
and material differentiation. This dynamic of how infrastructures subjugate, configure, or articulate different subject groups, 
besides a few exceptions – notably Graham and McFarlane (2015), Fredericks (2018), Lemanski (2019) – is yet relatively unex-
plored in geographical research on infrastructure. Second, the existing scholarship on social and political lives of infrastructure 
predominantly focuses on citizenship (Fredericks, 2018; Lemanski, 2019), or a public (Anand, 2017; De Boeck, 2012; Harvey 
& Knox, 2015; Von Schnitzler, 2018), as modes of relationality between the state and its publics constituted by techno- politics 
of infrastructure. This paper contributes to these literatures by discussing specific modalities of socio- political differentiation 
that cannot be readily explained through such liberal concepts as citizenship or public, and instead shows how a biopolitical 
boundary between an intended public of the state and populations excluded from the state's development visions and practices 
is reconfigured through infrastructure.
Regarding Kenya- focused research on mega- infrastructures, the analyses provided in this paper are situated at the inter-
section of critical geographical scholarship on global infrastructural politics (Enns & Bersaglio, 2020; Kimari & Ernstson, 
2020; Lesutis, 2020) and area studies research on lived, embodied experiences of mega- projects (Chome, 2020; Elliott, 2016; 
Kochore, 2016). Demonstrating how socio- political differentiation is constituted through mega- infrastructures, this paper con-
tributes to further understanding how global political projects – such as neo- colonial reiterations of empire (Enns & Bersaglio, 
2020; Kimari & Ernstson, 2020) or capital's expansion (Lesutis, 2020) advanced through mega- infrastructures – unfold in 
politically, socially, and materially mediated ways across Kenya. Focusing on how structural relations of power are experi-
enced along the lines of class, geography, and ethnicity, the paper echoes ethnographically grounded case studies of embod-
ied effects of large- scale infrastructures across Kenya (see Elliott, 2016; Kochore, 2016). While it does not explicitly look at 
the agency of excluded population groups to resist the state's practices of “development” as recent work on mega- projects 
explores (e.g., Chome, 2020; Cormack, 2016; Enns, 2019), like this scholarship, the analyses of multifariously experienced 
mega- infrastructures demonstrate that, besides re- constituting grand visions of “development,” capital's expansion, or empire, 
these projects also unfold as profoundly intimate relationalities of power through which life is made liveable or disavowed to 
precarity in contradictory ways. The unevenly mediated nature of these infrastructural experiences foregrounds the utility of 
such heuristic framework as the one developed in the paper in understanding techno- politics of infrastructure and biopolitical 
modalities of governance that they imbue.
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ENDNOTES
 1 Phase IIB, supposed to reach Kisumu by Lake Victoria, has been put on hold due to the lack of funding, as discussed below.
 2 The interview location that coincides with the location where this officer had worked is excluded to guarantee anonymity.
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